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LIMITATIONS ON STATE JURISDICTION OF UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES: EMPLOYEE SUITS AGAINST
UNIONS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
By GLEN M. BENDIXSEN* and WALTER L. KINTZ*
The traditional concept of a labor dispute is a controversy between
union and management. Society and government are becoming increasingly
aware of the rights of a third party, who may be either a non-member
employee or a union member, asserting a wrong by the union. This discus-
sion will deal primarily with the forum and remedies available to the em-
ployee who suffers as a result of arbitrary action by the union.
Most states hold that membership in an unincorporated association,
such as a union, creates enforceable property rights which are violated by
wrongful expulsion or other arbitrary action.' The theory is that union
membership constitutes a contractual relationship, the terms of which are
contained in the by-laws and constitution of the union.' California and a few
other jurisdictions have also imposed tort liability.3
The states have developed these remedies from traditional equitable
protection in analagous fields; they cannot be said to be the manifestation
of comprehensive state labor legislation. Federal remedies, on the other
hand, are a result of an attempt to formulate a broad program of regulation
of labor problems involving interstate commerce.
Federal Labor Legislation
To what extent do the federal labor acts affect state relief? As to union-
management disputes these acts provide a comprehensive scheme of federal
policy and regulations. The Wagner Act (NLRA) provides federal relief
for employer unfair labor practices. The Taft-Hartley (LMRA) amend-
ments add federal regulation of union unfair labor practices.' The Supreme
Court has held that together these acts evidence congressional intent to
pre-empt the field of union-management disputes in interstate commerce.5
The basic problem dealt with here is to what degree the same congres-
sional intent is manifest in the area of employee-union disputes. The answer
will disclose the extent to which the state remedies mentioned earlier will
be pre-empted. The supremacy of the federal government in matters involv-
* Members, Third-Year Class.
1 See generally, Stone, Wrongful Expulsion From Trade Unions: Judicial Intervention at
Anglo-American Law, 34 CAN. B. Rlv. 1111 (1956).2 1bid.
3 Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6 (1951) ; Otto v. Journey-
men Tailors' Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888) ; Tesoriero v. Miller, 274 App. Div. 670,
88 N.Y.S. 2d 87 (1949).
461 Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
5 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); see Cox, Federalism in the Law oj
Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954) ; Isaacson, Federal Pre-emption Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. RFV. 391 (1957-58).
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ing interstate commerce is well established.6 Pre-emption, where congress
has not stated specifically whether a federal statute has occupied a field in
which the states otherwise would be free to act, can occur under various
circumstances : 7 when the scheme of federal regulations is so pervasive that
the reasonable inference is that congress left no room for the states to sup-
plement it; when the field is one in which the federal interest is so dominant
that it precludes state action on the same subject; when enforcement of
state law would present a serious danger of conflict with the administration
of the national program. To clarify the extent to which federal law has
occupied the area of protection of the employee in relation to the union,
the following paraphrasings of the pertinent sections of the NLRA as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act are set forth.9
By section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act employees are given the right of
self-organization, to form or join labor organizations, and also the right to
refrain from doing so except as that right may be affected by a collective
bargaining agreement under the provisions of section 8 which authorizes a
union shop agreement.
By subsection (a) (3) of section 8, it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
terms or conditions of employment, or to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization; except that an employer may enter into an
agreement with a labor organization, which is the collective bargaining
agent of its employees, by which membership in the union, on or after the
30th day of employment, shall be a condition of employment. This is the
union shop provision.
In subsection (b) (1) of section 8 of the act it is made an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce an employee in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed him by section 7. By subsection (b) (2) it
is an unfair practice for a union to cause, or attempt to cause, an employer
to discriminate against an employee to whom membership in the union has
been denied on grounds other than failure to tender periodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership. Section 8(b) (1) also provides that the right of the union to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of mem-
bership shall not be impaired.
By section 8 (b) (5) the employees covered by an agreement authorized
under 8(a) (3) (the union shop provision) are protected from the exact-
ment by the union of excessive or discriminatory fees.
Subsections (A) and (B) of section 8(a) (3) provide that an employer
cannot justify discrimination against an employee for non-membership in a
union if he knows that either membership was not available to the employee
6 Ibid.
7 See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
8See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
9 See 61 Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88 (1952).
Feb., 1959]
on the same terms generally required, or that membership was denied or
terminated for any reason other than the failure to tender the usual dues
and initiation fees.
Section 10(c) authorizes the NLRB, upon the finding of an unfair labor
practice, to issue a cease and desist order and to take such affirmative action,
including ordering reinstatement of the employee with or without back pay,
as will effectuate the policies of the act.
These provisions provide an outline of the rights and remedies available
in the employee-union situation, with the exception of those regarding elec-
tion procedure. Until recently the Supreme Court had not determined the
superseding effect of this federal legislation.
The Gonzales Decision
Gonzales, a member of a union in interstate commerce, brought an ac-
tion in the California Superior Court claiming to have been expelled from
membership in violation of his rights under the union constitution and by-
laws. The court ordered reinstatement in the union and awarded damages for
lost wages and physical and mental suffering. The District Court of Appeal
affirmed.'0 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. In Interna-
tional A ssosciation of Machinists v. Gonzales," Justice Frankfurter, speak-
ing for six members of the Court, ruled that nothing in the NLRA, as
amended, displaced state power to award a wrongfully expelled union mem-
ber damages resulting from breach of his union membership contract. Chief
Justice Warren, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented on the grounds that
to sustain a state court damage award against the union for conduct, which
is also subject to an unfair labor proceeding under the NLRA, is to sanction
an improper duplication and conflict of remedies. 2
Note that the Gonzales case involved a union member who had a cause
of action in the state court for wrongful expulsion and arbitrary union con-
duct.13 The dissent conceded this, but argued that the California court was
in error in giving relief for lost wages when a parallel relief was available
in the NLRB under section 10(c) of the NLRA. This rests on the assump-
tion that the union refusal to dispatch Gonzales for work was an unfair
labor practice under section 8 (b) (2) of the act. As Gonzales had tendered
his dues and fees, union action causing the employer to discriminate would
have been a violation of that section. It is questionable whether the facts in
the Gonzales case constitute an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, there
is some doubt whether the defendant raised the issue of exclusive NLRB
jurisdiction at the proper time or in the correct procedural manner. How-
ever, this is not decisive here. The majority opinion indicates that whether
or not there is available relief in the NLRB for an unfair labor practice, the
state court did not err by filling out the remedy of reinstatement in the union
by an award of damages for back wages.
10 Gonzales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
11356 U.S. 617 (1958).
12 Id. at 623 (dissenting opinion).
13 See note 3 supra.
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On the same day Gonzales was decided, the Supreme Court held in
International Union U.A.W. v. Russell 4 that the Alabama court could
grant parallel relief, i.e., back pay for union action that was clearly an unfair
labor practice under the federal act. In this decision, as in Gonzales, the
state court had determined that a cognizable state cause of action existed
independent of the unfair labor practice, in this case violent and mass
picketing interfering with a non-union employee's right to work."8 (As will
be indicated ahead, the Supreme Court affirmance of an existing state cause
of action in Russell may represent a departure from previous cases.)'
Warren, again dissenting, rested upon much the same grounds as expressed
in Gonzales, but took particular exception to the grant, in Russell, of puni-
tive damages.' 7
The dissenters in Gonzales and Russell raised a vigorous protest that the
decisions are at odds with prior cases. They said in Gonzales: 18
Since the majority's decision on the permissibility of a state-court damage
award is at war with the policies of the Federal Act and contrary to the deci-
sions of this Court, it is not surprising that the bulk of its opinion is con-
cerned with the comforting irrelevancy of the State's conceded power to re-
instate the wrongfully expelled....
Together, these cases indicate that the Supreme Court may not apply the
same broad doctrine of pre-emption in the area of unfair labor practices
that has been applied in union-management controversies. Do the decisions
of the Court prior to these cases support a doctrine of pre-emption broad
enough to justify this dissenting view?
Pre-emption Before Gonzales
Exclusive NLRB jurisdiction for unfair labor practices in union-man-
agement litigation is supported by an extensive line of cases." The essence of
this doctrine is distilled in several significant decisions. Hill v. Florida ex.
rel. Watson 0 held that a state could not fix the requirements for collective
bargaining agents in interstate commerce. A state cannot impinge on the
full exercise of federally created rights. In Garner v. Teamsters Union,"'
the Supreme Court held that a state court could not enjoin picketing, which
was in violation of a state statute. As the activity was prohibited by federal
act, NLRB relief was exclusive. In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,22 the Court
overruled the application of a Missouri restraint of trade statute against a
union because the union conduct was subject to NLRB sanction. The ambit
14 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
15 International Union, UAW v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So.2d 175 (1956).
16 See notes 26 and 34 infra.
17 356 U.S. at 647 (dissenting opinion).
18 Id. at 623, 631 (dissenting opinion).
19 See note 5 supra.
20 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
21346 U.S. 485 (1953).
22 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
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was reached in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board" where the Court held
that a state had no power to deal with matters within the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, even though the Board had expressly declined to exercise its
jurisdiction.
It is clear from the foregoing decisions that the Supreme Court has
found parallel relief to be an intolerable interference with the federal
scheme. The Court does not rest its position either on the particular facts in
any case or on the parties involved, but rather on the paramount considera-
tion of protecting national interests in the area, regardless of the conse-
quences in any particular situation. Whether the conduct falls within the
prohibitions of section 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act, or within the protection
of section 7 as "concerted activity," state action is prohibited. 4 As indicated
in Garner:25
... [W] hen two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity,
a conflict is imminent. It must be remembered that petitioners' state remedy
was a suit for an injunction prohibiting the picketing. The federal Board,
if it should find a violation of the national Labor Management Relations
Act, would issue a cease-and-desist order and perhaps obtain a temporary
injunction to preserve the status quo. Or if it found no violation, it would
dismiss the complaint, thereby sanctioning the picketing....
The only extant exception to the rule enunciated above is found in
United Constr. Worker v. Laburnum Constr. Corp.26 The union's violent
actions caused property damage to the employer. The state's award of tort
damages was upheld by the Supreme Court. The decision was grounded in
the view that this was an area in which there was no comparable federal
relief, and that the wrong was within the scope of the traditional state police
power. The Russell case may be entirely explicable in terms of this excep-
tion. It also involved violence, but to an employee. The majority in Russell
place considerable weight on the fact that there, as in Laburnum, the only
federal relief available was injunctive, which does not compensate for in-
juries already suffered. Regardless of whether the point is well founded,
there is the common element of violence and in both cases the state award
of punitive damages was sustained.
In Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council27 the California Supreme
Court applied section 923 of the Labor Code as modified by the state Juris-
23353 U.S. 1 (1957).
24 See notes 19-23 supra. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951); International Union of
UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950). See also Building Trades Council v. Kinard Constr. Co.,
346 U.S. 933 (1954); Plankington Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 338
U.S. 953 (1950).
2 346 U.S. at 498-99.
26 347 U.S. 656 (1954). Accord, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266 (1956); Allen-Bradley Local 1111, UEW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
27 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958). See also Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Driver's
Union, 49 Cal. 2d 625, 320 P.2d 492 (1958).
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dictional Strike Actss to award damages for conduct which the Supreme
Court of the United States had, in a previous disposition of the same case,
held was an unfair labor practice.2 9 Gartnon was based on the proposition
that a state can supplement federal injunctive relief with damages where
state law has been violated. The case is distinguishable from the Laburnum
facts as there was no violence or property damage.
It should be noted that the Gartnon case involved a prior declination of
jurisdiction by the NLRB. This is reminiscent of the Guss case. While Guss
is the strongest of the pre-emption cases, it may have had an erosive effect on
the breadth of federal power in the mind of the Court.s° By disallowing
state relief even where the NLRB has declined to exercise its jurisdiction,
the decision created the unfortunate anomaly of a right without a remedy.
It is possible that this may lead the Court to seek substantial justice indi-
rectly: by searching for exceptions to the pre-emption doctrine. The "no
man's land" of Guss may have presaged the Gonzales decision.'
Pre-emption in Employee v. Union Controversy
Should the Supreme Court apply a broad doctrine of pre-emption in the
employee-union cases? The lower court decisions prior to Gonzales and
Russell suggest an affirmative answer. As Chief Justice Warren, dissenting
in Gonzales, pointed out:32
The state and federal courts that have considered the permissibility of
damage actions for the victims of job discrimination lend their weight to the
foregoing conclusion. While most sustain the State's power to reinstate
members wrongfully ousted from the union, they are unanimous in denying
the States power to award damages for the employer discriminations that
result from non membership. (Emphasis added.)
28 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1115-20.
2 9 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
30 See note, 72 HRV. L. REv. 142 (1958).
31 See note, 46 CAmF. L. Rav. 643 (1958). See also Tobriner and Grodin, Taft-Hartley Pre-
emption in the Area of NLRB Inaction, 44 Camir. L. Rav. 663 (1956). Written before Guss was
decided, these authors appear to question NLRB withdrawal of jurisdiction, especially if con-
strued to allow state action where a federal scheme clearly exists.
32356 U.S. at 623, 628-29 (dissenting opinion) citing: Born v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407 (9th
Cir. 1954) (holding a federal court has no jurisdiction to award plaintiff loss of wages against
union-exclusive jurisdiction in the NLRB); McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 89
A.2d 566 (1956); Morse v. Local 1058 Carpenters and Joiners, 78 Idaho 405, 304 P.2d 1097
(1956) ; Sterling v. Local Union 438, Liberty Ass'n of Steam & Power Pipe Fitters, 207 Md. 132,
113 A.2d 389 (1955) ; Real v. Curran, 285 App. Div. 552, 138 N.Y.S. 2d 809 (1955) ; Mahoney v.
Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 45 Wash. 2d 453, 275 P.2d 440 (1954). Contra: Selles v. Local 174,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, S0 Wash. 2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957). California, by Gonzales, appears
to be also contra. California district courts of appeal are in line with that decision. See Interna-
tional Sound Technicians v. Superior Ct., 141 Cal. App. 2d 23, 296 P.2d 395 (1956); Taylor v.
Marine Cooks & Stewards Ass'n, 117 Cal. App. 2d 556, 256 P.2d 595 (1953). See also, for the
view of the California Supreme Court: Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage
Employees and Motion Picture Machine Operators, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958). (Three
members of the court dissented on the grounds that exclusive jurisdiction for the unfair labor
practice causing lost wages was in the NLRB, and the Int'l Sound Technicians above is no
longer law as a result of Guss and other pre-emption decisions.)
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In Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific33 (one of the cases cited by
the Chief Justice in support of the above statement) a member of a union
in interstate commerce brought an action in a state court for wrongful ex-
pulsion from the union. Such union conduct is not the basis of an unfair
labor practice. However, the plaintiff sought lost wages resulting from
union pressure causing the employer to discriminate against him. This
union conduct was a violation of section 8 (b) (2) of the act and under sec-
tion 10(c) the NLRB can award job reinstatement and back wages. The
Washington Supreme Court split the lower court's decision, affirming the
grant of reinstatement in the union and damages for injury to property
rights arising out of union membership, but reversing the grant of back
wages on the grounds that the NLRB had exclusive jurisdiction to give
relief for the unfair labor practice.
Is the utility of pre-emption in this area sufficient to warrant the pro-
cedural problem involved in requiring the plaintiff to resort to two forums
for a complete remedy? When a state court entertains an action for wrong-
ful expulsion, the rights and duties of the employee and the union are based
on state law of general application as to the consequences of union member-
ship. The employee and the union are involved in a conflict independent of
a bona fide labor dispute. In contrast, when a state is asked to award lost
wages, the court must examine a conflict with which the federal acts are
concerned. In Mahoney, for example, to grant back wages the court must
decide; one, was the union causing the employer to discriminate; two, did
the employer discrimination damage the plaintiff? These questions are com-
ponents of a bona fide labor dispute. Preclusion of state action in such dis-
putes, as has been illustrated, is the policy of the federal labor acts. A state
grant of relief, even though combined with a state cause of action, necessi-
tates state court determination of such a dispute. To condone this is con-
trary to the policy of the acts.34
As indicated above the majority of the state court decisions prior to
Gonzales are confined to the Mahoney approach, thus avoiding the appli-
cation of state law to unfair labor practices covered by the Taft-Hartley
Act. Further, Gonzales is divergent from the line of Supreme Court cases
which develop pervasive federal jurisdiction of labor disputes in interstate
commerce. It is incongruous for the Supreme Court to open the door to
parallel state relief when state courts, as in Mahoney, have confined their
jurisdiction to membership rights. The Gonzales decision entails the inter-
ference of state law with national uniformity in the regulation of bona fide
labor disputes. We conclude that in view of the limited precedent and
preferable policy the decision is an unfortunate departure.
33 See note 32 supra. Cf. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
34 356 U.S. at 623, 631-32 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Cox, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 1322-23,
1334-35. See Warren dissenting in Russell, 356 U.S. at 649 to the effect that state causes of
actions involving interstate commerce are permissible only when they can be determined "with-
out regard to the merits of the labor controversy ......
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Furthering the Aims of the Federal Act
The Gonzales and Russell decisions illustrate the dangers of parallel
relief in employee-union suits. Section 1 of Taft-Hartley declares that one
purpose of the Act is the protection of "the rights of individual employees
in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect com-
merce.M5 There is nothing in this express declaration which would lead
the reader to believe that the above purpose is any less an integral part of
the scheme than the other objectives. Yet Justice Frankfurter, the author of
the Gonzales majority opinion, states that "Protection of union members
in their rights... from arbitrary conduct by unions ... has not been under-
taken by federal law, . .. , The express provisions in the NLRA dealing
with the employee viz-h-viz the union have already been indicated. 7 In
section 10(c), where it specifically provides for employee suits against
unions, it most certainly has undertaken what Justice Frankfurter says it
has not. To the extent that such a federal scheme exists, the dissents in both
Russell and Gonzales were espousing sound doctrines of pre-emption inhold-
ing that state action is precluded if it will disrupt an established national
policy."' The Russell case did not involve an expulsion. The state cause of
action can only rest on the grounds of a violent unfair labor practice under
Laburnum. Even so, as Chief Justice Warren points out, federal tolerance
of state action where a federal plan exists, does not extend to state exercise
of remedies which destroy national uniformity." Though violent, the union
conduct was an unfair labor practice touched by the federal act. As the
Chief Justice indicates in referring to the excessive punitive damages in
Russell:4 .
... [T] he element of deterrence inherent in the imposition or availability of
punitive damages for conduct that is an unfair labor practice ordinarily
makes such a recovery repugnant to the Federal Act....
In Gonzales the cause of action for expulsion is encompassed in no
specific provision of the NLRA. However, the allowance of a state award
of back wages in the decision subjects to divergent state law labor disputes
for which the NLRA attempts national uniformity. For example, relief of
the nature applied by the Alabama court is at great variance with that
which the NLRB would have brought to bear on the same activity.42 The
board's grant of back wages under section 10(c) is discretionary. By ex-
35 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
86 356 U.S. at 617, 620.
87 See note 4 supra.
88 See note 34 supra.
39 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.4
o Ibj.
41356 U.S. at 647, 652 (dissenting opinion).
4 2 The court awarded $10,000 in punitive damages. Russell was only one of thirty em-
ployees bringing suit for $50,000 punitive damages aside from compensatory relief. At the time
of the Russell decision in the Supreme Court, an appeal was pending in the Alabama Supreme
Court on a verdict and judgment given in one of those suits for $18,450.
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amining all the elements of a labor conflict, it can use the federal means
provided to fully develop and preserve the policy of promoting industrial
peace in industries affecting interstate commerce.43
Conclusion
We have discussed what we feel to be undesirable recent developments
in the area of federalism in labor law. In so doing, the Mahoney decision
was presented as a more desirable alternative, but it is far from a complete
solution. The employee-union relationship involves a complex of rights and
duties, many aspects of which require statutory regulation. The same rea-
sons which necessitate a uniform federal control of union-management dis-
putes are persuasive here. The Gonzales and Russell decisions interpret the
federal statutes as bearing very little upon the employee-union relationship.
Mahoney, while less restrictive, allows the application of state law to deter-
mine union membership rights. Inconsistent state determination of even
these rights conflicts with an important aspect of the federal plan.
Congressional creation of a bargaining agent which must be respected
by all the employees contemplates some concern for the protection of mem-
bers in the union. On the matter of wrongful expulsion, section 10(c) of
the act provides redress for arbitrary union conduct and empowers the
Board to take any affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of
the act. The act permits a union to set up its own standards for membership;
but it does not follow from this that, in accordance with the above section,
the Board should not be concerned with this fundamental element; i.e.,
union membership. Of even more grave consequence, the state may fail to
afford the employee justice against the organization with which federal law
insists he must deal.
The Supreme Court has held that under both the NLRA as amended by
Taft-Hartley and under the Railway Labor Act,44 congressional condona-
tion of monopoly collective bargaining power makes fair representation
and non-discrimination obligatory for member and non-member alike.4 ' A
certified union cannot discriminate against a non-member employee on the
basis of race.46 Nor can a bargaining agent seek higher wages for only its
own members. These are but a few graphic examples of federal concern
that the union respect the rights of non-members.47 Supreme Court refusal
to extend federal protection to union membership rights on similar grounds
stems from a reluctance to interpret the federal acts as bearing heavily on
43 See Tobriner and Grodin, op. cit. supra, note 31 at 680-84.
44 44 Stat. 577-87 (1926), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1952).
45 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers' Union, 350 U.S.
892 (1955); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Choate v. Grand Int'l Bhd.
of Locomotive Engineers, 314 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1958).
46 Syres v. Local 23, Oil Workers Union, supra, note 45. Cf. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248 (1944).
47 Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954), discussed in 68 H~Av. L. Rv. 145
(1954).
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the member-union relationship" Yet, prevailing state law affords an em-
ployee no means of redress against refusal of union membership on such
intolerable grounds as race.49 Was it the congressional intent to endow the
union with the exclusive right of representaton, while leaving to the states
the arbitrary power to exclude persons from participation in the representa-
tive agency? If that be the case, congressional amendment is the indicated
solution.
48 Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (N.D. Ohio), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 893 (1957). It was unsuccessfully argued that federal certification was suffi-
dent to change the character of the union to a federal agency, thus warranting application of
the fifth amendment sanctions against union exclusion on the basis of race. See Note, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 942 (1958).
49 See generally: Aaron and Komaroff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44
Irm. L. REv. 425, 451-56 (1949). California has held that a union cannot maintain a union shop
and a dosed union at the same time. See James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329
(1944). See also Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Motion
Picture Machine Operators, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494 (1958), cited by one writer as standing
for the proposition that California has extended the James case to become the only state in
absence of legislation to order a union to admit an employee to membership. See 67 YArM L. J.
1327 (1958). See also Note, 9 HAsTiNGs L. J. 211 (1958) (arguing that the functions of a labor
union are state action and subject to the fourteenth amendment).
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